BS IEC 61513 pdf download Nuclear power plants — Instrumentation and control for systems important to safety — General requirements for systems
1.1 General
l&C systems important to safety may be implemented using conventional hard-wired equip-ment, computer-based (CB) equipment or by using a combination of both types of equipment.This International Standard provides requirements and recommendations (see note) for thetotal l&C system architecture which may contain either or both technologies.
NOTE ln the following,the term requirements is used as a comprehensive term for both requirements andrecommendations.The distinction appears at the level of the specific provisions. where requirements are expressedby “shall” and recommendations by “should”.
This standard highlights the need for complete and precise requirements,derived from theplant safety goals, as a pre-requisite for generating the comprehensive requirements for thetotal l&C system architecture, and hence for the individual l&C systems important to safety.
This standard introduces the concept of a safety life cycle for the total l&C system architecture,and a safety life cycle for the individual systems. The life cycles illustrated in,and followed by,this standard are not the only ones possible; other life cycles may be followed, provided thatthe objectives stated in this standard are satisfied.
1.2 Application: new and pre-existing plants
This standard applies to the l&C of new nuclear power plants as well as to l&C up-grading orback-fitting of existing plants.
For existing plants,only a subset of requirements is applicable and this subset is identified atthe beginning of any project.
1.3 Framework
Figure 1 presents the overall framework of this standard, with its normative clauses:.clause 5 addresses the total architecture of the l&C systems important to safety:
defining requirements for the l&C functions,and associated systems and equipment(1&C FSE) derived from the safety analysis of the NPP,the categorisation of l&cfunctions, and the plant lay-out and operation context;
structuring the totality of the l&C architecture, dividing it into a number of systems andassigning the l&C functions to systems. Design criteria are identified, including those togive defence in depth and to minimise potential for common cause failure (CCF);
planning the total architecture of l&C systems.
clause 6 addresses the requirements for the individual l&C systems important to safety,particularly the requirements for computer-based systems;
clauses 7 and 8 address the overall integration, commissioning,operation and maintenanceof the l&C systems;
annex A highlights the relations between IAEA and basic safety concepts that are usedthroughout this standard;
annex B provides information on the categorisation/classification principles;annex C gives examples of l&C sensitivity to CCF;
annex D provides guidance to support comparison of this standard with parts 1, 2 and 4 ofIEC 61508. This annex surveys the main requirements of IEC 61508 to verify that theissues relevant to safety are adequately addressed,considers the use of common termsand explains the reason for adopting different or complementary techniques or terms.
2Normative references
The following normative documents contain provisions which，through reference in this text,constitute provisions of this International ‘Standard. For dated references,subsequentamendments to,or revisions of，any of these publications do not apply. However，parties toagreements based on this International Standard are encouraged to investigate the possibilityof applying the most recent editions of the normative documents indicated below.For undatedreferences，the latest edition of the normative document referred to applies.Members of lECand lS0 maintain registers of currently valid lnternational Standards.
IEC 60709:1981,Separation within the reactor protection system
IEC 60780:1998，Nuclear power plants – Electrical equipment of the safety system -Qualification
IEC 60880:1986,Software for computers in the safety systems of nuclear power stations
IEC 60880-2;2000，Software for computers important to safety for nuclear power plants – Part2: Software aspects of defence against common cause failures, use of software tools and ofpre-developed ‘software
IEC 60964:1989, Design for control rooms of nuclear power plants
IEC 60965:1989,Supplementary control points for reactor shutdown without access to the maincontrol room
IEC 60987:1989,Programmed digital computers important to safety for nuclear power stations
IEC 61000-4-1:2000，Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-1: Testing and measure-ment techniques – overview of lEC 61000-4 series
IEC 61000-4-2:1995, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)- Part 4:Testing and measurementtechniques – Section 2: Electrostatic discharge immunity test.Basic EMC Publication
IEC 61000-4-3:1995，Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)- Part 4:Testing and measurementtechniques – Section 3: Radiated, radio-frequency, electromagnetic field immunity test
IEC 61000-4-4:1995,Electromagnetic compatibility(EMC) – Part 4: Testing and measurementtechniques – Section 4: Electrical fast transient/burst immunity test.Basic EMC Publication
IEC 61000-4-5:1995,Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4:Testing and measurementtechniques – Section 5: Surge immunity test
IEC 61000-4-6:1996,Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4: Testing and measurementtechniques – Section 6: lmmunity to conducted disturbances, induced by radio-frequency fields
BS IEC 61513 pdf download Nuclear power plants — Instrumentation and control for systems important to safety — General requirements for systems
